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This paper provides estimates of the trade impacts of U.S. antiduznping law and the
detemilnants of suit filing activity from 1980-1985. We study three possible channels through
which the threat or mere possibility of antidumping duties can restrict trade which we believe,
when combined with the direct effects of duties, capture most of the trade effects of antidumping
Jaw. We refer to these three non-duty effects as the Investigationeffect, thesuspensioneffect,
andthe withdrawaleffect. Investigationeffects occur when an antiduinping investigation takes
place; suspension effects occur under so-called "suspension agreements"; and withdrawal effects
occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final detcm,ination. We find substantial
trade restrictions associated with the first two effects, but not with the third. Finally, we find
evidence suggesting that some firms inkinieantidumpingprocedures for the trade restricting
investigation effects alone.
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Do antidumping laws have and-competitive consequences and restrict trade?' These
questions arise repeatedly in multilateral and bilateral trade talks. Although there are reasons to
suspect that antidumping laws do have such effects, there is little known about the size of these
effects in practice, and even less about the mechanism by which they occur. This paper provides
estimates of the trade impacts of U.S. antidumping law and the determinants of suit filing activity
from 1980-1985.
A simple view of how antidumping law restricts trade is that trade flows are affected only
when antidumping duties are imposed. Several researchers have challenged this view, arguing
that the threat or mere possibility of duties can also restrict trade. We study three possible
channels through which these indirect effects may arise which we believe, when combined with
the direct effects of duties, capture most of the trade effects of antidumping law.2 We refer to
the three non-duty effects as the "investigation effect," the "suspension effect," and the
"withdrawal effect." Investigation effects occur when an antidumping investigation takes place;
suspension effects occur under so-called "suspension agreements" (where an investigation is
suspended in exchange for a promise by foreign firms to stop dumping); and withdrawal effects
occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final determination.
'Dumped imports are defined under U.S. law to be foreign products that are exported to the
U.S. market at export prices below "fair value," i.e., either below the prices of comparable
products for sale in the domestic market of the exporting country or below costs of production.
2Thereis a growing empirical literature concerned with the determinants and impacts of
antidumping petitions. See, for example, Finger (1981), Hernander and Schwartz (1986),
Salvatore (1987), Hartigan, Kamma and Perry (1989), Messerlin (1989, 1990), Lichtenberg and
Tan (1990), Harrison (1991) and Prusa (1991).
IOur empirical analysis gauges the effect of antidumping petitions by measuring the
response of imports and domestic output to the filing and resolution of suits. We use data on the
timing and outcome of every antidumping investigation in the United States over the period 1980-
1985 which covered a manufactured product. We focus on this period because U.S. antidumping
law was altered substantially in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979. Our empirical analysis makes
three contributions to the existing literature. First, we identi& separate trade effects for each
phase of the antiduinping investigation process, and distinguish among an exhaustive list of post-
investigation outcomes. Second, we address aggregation issues that arise when one attempts to
assess the impact of investigations covering multiple product categories. Third, we jointly
estimate filing, import, and output equations that allow for the joint determination of the decision
to file, the level of imports, and domestic output.3
Our focus on the broader trade effects of antidumping law allows us to consider the
possibility that there are two distinct filing strategies being pursued by firms in our sample. In
modelling the determinants of suit filing activity, we allow for the coexistence of "outcome filers"
and "process filers." Outcome filers are firms who appear motivated by the expectation that they
The two papers closest in spirit to our work are Lichtenberg and Tan (1990) and Harrison
(1991). Lichtenberg and Tan estimate filing, import, and output equations, but do not allow for
their joint determination. Moreover, they abstract from investigation effects entirely, focussing
instead on the implications of different post-investigation outcomes for import and output levels.
Harrison estimates import-price equations with a focus on investigation and duty effects, but
abstracts from the filing decision entirely. Neither paper makes an attempt to distinguish imong
the vanous phases of the investigation process, nor does eitherpaper attempt to account
exhaustively for the various post-investigation outcomes. Finally, neither paper attempts to
account for the multiplicity of filings and/or duties that may arise in a given industry-year
observation.
2can secure a finding of dumping. Alternatively, process filers file petitions largely for the trade-
restricting effects generated by the investigation process alone.
Our results suggest that several of the non-duty effects of antidumping law are quite
substantial. First, suspension agreements lead to restricted import flows and expandedimport-
competing domestic output, and these effects are similar in magnitude to the effects of
antidwnping duties in our sample. Second, we fmd that investigation effects are substantial,
reducing the flow of imports during the period of investigation by roughly half the reduction in
import flow that would be expected if duties were imposed. Finally, we do not fmd much
evidence of a strong withdrawal effect.
Regarding filing activity, we fmd that variables used to determine injury in antidumping
proceedings are important predictors of filing activity by finns. This suggests that the prospect
of a dumping finding (which requires a detennination of injury) is an important ingredient in
the decision to file. However, we also fmd evidence of filing activity which appears to be driven
largely by a desire to secure the trade-restricting effects generated by the investigation process
itself. Coupled with our finding of a substantial investigation effect, we interpret this latter result
as suggesting that firms sometimes initiate antidumping procedures for the investigation effects
alone.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first describe U.S. antidumping law. Next we
elaborate on the three non-duty effects that are the focus of our analysis, and describe two
alternative filing strategies which may be used by industries. Our empirical analysis first
examines the effect of antidumping duties. We thai generalize this model to incorporate our
three non-duty effects. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results.
32. U.S. AntidumpingLaw
We begin by providing a summary of the steps involved in a U.S. dumping investigation,
from initiating the investigation to the final determination and assessment of duties.4 This
description motivates our empirical specifications below.
Before describing the actual investigation procedure, we make several preliminary
observations. First, there are two findings necessary for a determination of dumping under U.S.
law: (I) sales of imports at less-than-fair-value (LTFV); and (ii) material injury to the domestic
industry duetothese imports. One government agency is assigned to each of these determina-
tions--the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines injury to the domesticindustryand
the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration (ITA) makes the LTFV
determination. Second, for each of these decisions, there is a preliminary and final decision
made by each agency. The statutory time allotted for the entire investigation ranges from 10
months to up to 14 months under special circumstances.
We now describe the U.S. antidumping investigation process. Figure 1 summarizes the
timing of the various stages of the suit resolution process.
lnvestwation Procedure
Once an antidwnping petition is filed with the Commerce Department's International
Trade Administration (ITA) and with the International Trade Commission (ITC), the ITA has 20
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 involved a major rewriting of U.S. antidumping laws.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 contains several amendments to the antidumping law of the
1979 Act that, while substantive, are not relevant for the particular issues we consider here.
4daystomakea"petitiondetinalion"atowhetherthepeUtionisinorderand,ifso,
commence an investigation.'
ITC Preliminary Injury Determination: If the petition determination is affirmative, the
ITC then has 45daysto make a preliminrnydetenninationofwhether the industry under review
is "materially injured," "threatened with material injuzy," or that the establishment of the industry
"is materially retarded" as a result of the imports under investigation. If the ITC's preliminary
determination is negative, the investigation is terminated as Figure 1 indicates. If the ITC' s
preliminary determination is affirmative, as it was for 86% of the products investigated over our
sample period of 1980-85, then the investigation will run its course unless the petitioner takes
action to terminate or suspend the case.
ITA Preliminary LTFV Determination: Provided the ITC's preliminary determination
is affirmative, and within 160 days of the initial filing of the suit (or within 90 days if all
interested parties agree to a "waiver of verification"), the ITA must make a preliminary
determination of whether there is reasonable evidence that merchandise "is being sold, or is likely
to be sold at less than fair value."6 As Figure 1 depicts, a negative preliminary determination by
the ITA does not terminate the investigation. However, if the preliminary determination of the
ITA is affirmative, as it was on 93% of the products whose investigations made it past the
preliminary injury detennination over the period 1980-85, then the ITA must provide an estimate
Petitions can be either "self4nitiated" by the ITA or initiated by an "intered party" on
behalf of the industry. The former is by far the exception, with the most prominent example
being the Trigger Price Mechanism.
6 In "extraordinarily complicated"cases, the ITA may postpone maldng its preliminary
determination until the 210th dayafter filing.
5of the "dumping margin," and is required to order the "suspension of liquidation" of the affected
imported goods and the posting by importers of a cash deposit orbond to cover the estimated
dumpingdutiespayable, pending thefinal outcome of the investigation.
At any point after the hA's preliminary determination, the investigation may be
terminated or suspended, or it may continue on to the final determination. Termination prior to
the final determination occurs if and only if the petition is withdrawn by the petitioner, an action
that was taken on 42% of the products whose investigations made it past the preliminary injury
deternilnation during the 1980-85 period, with a large portion taken in the steel industry.
Termination usually comes about as a result of price agreements reached by the domestic industry
and foreign firms named in the suit? Suspension occurs if the foreign firms that are the subject
of the dumping allegation reach an agreement with the ITA to (i) eliminate LTFV sales to the
U.S. market, (ii) cease exporting to the U.S. market completely, or (iii) under "extraordinary
circumstances," eliminate the "injurious effect" of their actions, including any margin of
"underselling" (i.e., undercutting the price of the domestic product), without necessarily raising
price so high as to eliminstethe fullmargin of dumping. Such agreements were negotiated for
2% of the products whose investigations made it past the preliminary injury determination during
the 1980-85 period. In the case of suspension, any violation of the agreement will result in
automatic renewal of the investigation.
Agreements between foreign firms and domestic petitioners are permitted under the Noerr-
inzigton doctrine which exempts such parties from prosecution under U.S. antitrust law.
However, direct conversations between domestic and foreign firms concerning prices or quantities
would not be protected.Consequently, settlements are typically negotiated through the
Commerce Department (Horlick, 1989). See Prusa (1992) for a thorough analysis of this
exemption and its implications for the effects of antidumping law.
6ITA Final LTFV Determination: If the case is neither terminated nor suspended, then
the ITA must within 75 days of its preliminary determination make a final determination of
whether the merchandise under investigation "isbeing,or is likely to be" sold in the United States
at less than fair value.Z
ITC Final Injury Determination: If the ITA's preliminary determination was
affirmative, then as depicted in Figure 1 the FFC must make its final determination of injury
within 45 days of the ITA's final determination (or within 120 days of the ITA's preliminary
determination, whichever is later). If the ITA's preliminary determination was negative, and its
final determination is affirmative, then the ITC has 75 days from the ITA's affirmative final
determination to make its final determination of injury. Lastly, if the final determinations of both
the ITA and ITC are affirmative, the hA has 7 days within which to instruct customs officers
to assess the appropriate antidumping duties. Assessment of dumping duties occurred for 35%
of the products whose investigations made it past the preliminary injury determination over the
period 1980-85. If either the ITC or the ITA final determination is negative, the investigation
is tenninated, an outcome which occurred for 21% of the products whose investigations made it
past the preliminary injury determination over the l98085 period.
Assessment of Antidumping Duties: Provided that the final determinations of injury and
LTFV sales are both positive, the "definitive" dumping margins for purposes of assessing
antidumping duties must then be calculated; These calculations are made on the basis ofthe
prices of the imports to which they will apply (as opposed to the margins calculatedfor the
The ITA may postpone its final determination until the 135th day after its preliminary
determination if requested to do so by either the petitioner or the firms against which the
dumping allegations were made.
7LTFV determination,which are calculated based on a sample of imports over an historic period
which typically covers the six months preceding the initiation of the petition). The final
assessment of antidumping duties applies retroactively only if the preliminary LTFV determina-
tion was affirmative. In this case, antidumping duties would normally be assessed on the relevant
imports from the date of the preliminary LTFV determination forward. However, if the industry
alleges "critical circumstances" and the ITA and ITC find evidence both that there are "massive"
imports of the relevant product over a "relatively short period" which cause material injury, and
that there is either a history of dumping in the industry or that importers were or should have
been knowledgeable about ongoing dumping, the dumping duties can be applied retroactively 90
days prior to the preliminary LTFV finding?
Thus, there are, in effect, three possible ranges of imports to which antidumping duties
may apply once an affirmative fmal determination is made. If the preliminary LTFV
determination was negative, duties equal to the actual dumping margins will be imposed on the
relevant imports entering the United States on or after the date of final determination. If,
alternatively, the preliminary LTFV determination was affirmative, antidumping duties reflecting
actual dumping margins will be imposed on imports entering the United States (1) on or after the
date of the preliminary LTFV determination, or (ii) in the case of critical circumstances, 91) days
prior to the date of the preliminary LTFV determination.
Having described the antidumping investigation procedure and possible post-investigation
outcomes, we now describe the investigation, suspension, and withdrawal effects identified in the
In practice, however, the conditions for critical circumstances are rarely met.
8Introduction, aswelt as two distinct filing strategies. We also develop the research hypotheses
thatguide our empirical investigation.'0
Investl2ation Effects
Dale (1980, pp. 85-86) discusses two possible reasons for the existence of investigation
effects associated with antidumping petitions. The first focuses on the pricing behavior of
exporters. As discussed above, in cases where the final injury and dumping determinations are
positive and where the preliniinazy LTFV determination was alsoaffirmative,duties are typically
imposedretroactively on imports that enter the United States after the date of the preliminary
LTFV finding. The "defmitive" margin on which these duties are based is recalculated to reflect
the actual dumping margins for imports entering after this date. Thus, an exporter who receives
an affinnative preliminary LTFV determination and expects the final determination also to be
affirmative can nonetheless reduce antidumping duties, or even avoid them altogether, by raising
its price on goods exported after the preliminary LTFV determination date. Under these
circumstances, we expect an affirmative preliminaryLTFVfinding would lead to a sharp drop
intherateofimportsandtoañnpdces,withtheseeffectslastingfortheremainderofthe
investigation. Moreover, the rate of imports might be expected to rise somewhat with the filing
of a petition in anticipation of its future fall." A second explanation for investigation effects
'°Inaddition to these three non-duty effects, a number of papers, e.g., Prusa (1988),
Anderson (1992), and Staiger and Wolak (1992a), have suggested that the mere existence of
antidumping law can have trade effects even in periods when no petition is filed. We do not
attempt to capture such effects in what follows.
However, as discussed above, a sufficiently large increase in the flow of imports between
thedateapetitionwasfiledandthedateofapreliminaiyLlFVdeterminationcouldtriggerthe
"critical circumstances" provisions of U.S. antidumping law which allow duties to be imposed
retroactively back to the date of filing.
9focuses on the importers of the products under investigation. U.S. law requires that antidumping
duties be imposed on the importer rather than on foreign exporters)2 As such, an affirmative
preliminary LTFV finding places the importer at considerable risk in terms of liability for future
duty payments on any imports purchased after that date. Again, this suggests that an affirmative
preliminary LTFV fmding, coupled with an expectation that there is a significant possibility that
the fmal determination will also be affirmafive, wouldleadto a —dropin the rate of imports
and to a rise in prices, with these effects lasting for the remainder of the investigation.'3 Again,
the rate of imports might, if anything, rise when a petition is filed in anticipation of its future fall.
A third alternative to the two interpretations of investigation effects put forward by Dale
(1980) is possible if domestic firms use the investigation of pricing and sales practices of foreign
firms to dampen competition during times when costly price wars might otherwise erupt (see
Staiger and Wolak, 1991, 1992b, and 1994).14Aformal treatment of the anti-competitive effects
12
Exportersare allowed to reimburse importers for duty payments only if the agreement
to purchase was made before the preliminary LTFV detennination and where the products are
exported before the final dumping determination (Dale, 1980, p. 105).
Anecdotal support for the tnde-restricting effects of preliminnry dumping findings is
common. For example, in reference to a U.S. antidumping petition brought by the National
Knitwear & Sportswear Association against sweater producers in Hong Kong, South Korea, and
Taiwan, The New York Times observes:
The [preliminary dumping] margins were announced as retailers are about to place orders
for delivery next fall. Some industry officials said prospects of higher prices, or just the
uncertainty over what the new price levels would be, could eause some retailers to switch
to domestic suppliers (The New York Times, April 24, 1990, p. Cl).
It is worth noting that the use of antiduinping law as a tool to avoid price wars with
foreign rivals has been explicitly documented in at least one instance. In January, 1938, the
South African Iron and Steel Corporation filed an antidumping petition against steel producers
in the Umted States for selling steel in the South African market at prices below those agreed
upon by the International Steel Cartel. Dumping duties were levied and the Cartel's pricing
arrangements restored (see Hexner, 1943). Less direct evidence of firms turning to antidwnping
10of antidumping investigations centers on four features of antidumping law: (i) the preliminary
fmding of injury, which is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that the investigation will run
its year-long course unless the petitioner chooses to stop it, is relatively easy to secure since the
fTC typically relies on information provided by the petitioner at this preliminary stage of the
investigation; (ii) price-cutting during the investigation period by foreign firms named in the
petition will raise the likelihood that an affirmative dumping determination would result from the
investigation; (iii) the prospect that foreign firms will face antiduinping duties if they cut prices
during the investigation period will reduce their incentive to do so; and (iv) the competition-
dampening investigation effect noted in (iii) is only secured by filing the antidumping petition.'3
Under these four points, we have argued (Staiger and Wolak, 1991) that the filing of an
antidumping petition can dampen competition and lead to greater market share for domestic
firms--and in fact to a fall in imports and a rise in domestic output—during the entire period of
investigation. These investigation effects occur because by filing an antidumping petition,the
domestic industry is able to diminish the incentives of foreign firms to aggressively pursue
law to avert price wars is provided by Messerlin (1990) for the European Community chemical
industry.
Of these four points, (ii) is the least self-evident, and requires some elaboration here. A
crucial step in the fTC's injury determination is establishing a causal link between dumped
imports and injury to the domestic industry. Here, the fTC relies heavily onevidence of
"underselling," that is, sales of the imported good in the domestic market at a pricebelow that
of the domestically produced "like product," and of a relationship between such undersellingand
increases in foreign market share. Moreover, in its final determination of injury the ITC routinely
considers data that become available during the period of investigation. Thus, were a foreign
firm to cut its price in the domestic market during the period of investigation and steal market
share, this would increase the likelihood of an ITC finding of increased foreign marketshare by
reason of "underselling," and would consequently raise the likelihood of a finaldetermination of
injury and the prospect of antidumping duties.
11domestic market share while the investigation is proceeding. Hence, with aggressive pricing
policies now relatively less attractive for foreign firms, higher domestic prices (and lower
imports) can be maintained even as domestic firms increase output
Susvension and Withdrawal Effects
It should be clear from our discussion of investigation procedures at the beginning of this
section that the imposition of antidumping duties is not the only way that antidumping
proceedings can have a lasting effect on post-investigation import flows. Suspension agreements,
negotiated between the hA and foreign firms named in the antidumping.petition, are clearly
meant to have lasting impacts on import prices and volumcs, and are monitored and enforced by
the ITA to ensure that they do have such effects. Because the intent of a suspension agreement
is to provide a non-duty alternative by which previous dumping activities can be halted, it would
be surprising if there were not a "suspension effect" in the data. A prominent example involving
such a suspension agreement (though not falling in our sample period) was the 1986 U.S.-Japan
Semiconductor Trade Arrangement
On the other hand, petitions which are withdrawn by the domestic industry prior to a final
determination are simply terminated, and it might seem a priori that a petition withdrawal should
allow import flows to continue at (or return to) pie-investigation levels just as in a negative
determination. Prusa (1992) has provided a bargaining model which overturns this a priori view.
According to Prusa, the antidumping investigation process provides the domestic firms with both
a threat of antidumping duties against their foreign rivals as well as cover from domestic antitrust
laws under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see also note 7), allowing them to coordinate on a
more trade-restrictive arrangement with foreign firms which is then implemented upon the
12withdrawal of the antiduxnping petition by the domestic finns. This implies that a withdrawn
petition could have lasting effects on imports if the investigation process allows foreign and
domestic finns to coordinate output or prices in subsequent periods.
FumE StrateRies
It would be natural to think of filing activity as reflecting the desire to secure a finding
of dumping and the explicit remedies under the law that such a finding would bring forth, i.e.,
antidumping duties or a suspension agreement in lieu of duties. We wilt call finns that pursue
such a filing strategy "outcome filers." However, the potential for investigation and withdrawal
effects as described above leads to the possibility of another ffling strategy: Firms might
knowingly file "meritless" antidumping petitions just to trigger the process that leads to these
latter effects. We will call firms that pursue this second filing strategy "process filers.' For the
process filing strategy to make sense, two logical conditions must hold. First, the antidumping
investigation process itself must be obtainable even when a full investigation would not be
wananted on the merits of the case. And second, the significant possibility of a dumping finding
can not be a prerequisite for the sought-after investigation and/or withdrawal effects.
Because the investigation process is secured once an affirmative preliminary injury
determination is made, the first condition above is likely to be met given the strict 45-day time
limit within which the ITC must make this determination, a time constraint which forces the ITC
to rely heavily at this stage of the investigation on information provided by petitioners. Thus,
firms that want the antidumping investigation process should find it relatively easy to obtain,
regardless of the merits of their dumping claims.
13However, what the process itself is worth when the case against foreign firms is weak is
less clear. Dale's (1980) interpretations of the investigation effect imply that petitions which
were known by the industry to have little chance of resulting in a finding of dumping would be
unlikely to have strong trade-restricting effects associated with the investigation process, since
the explanationsunderlyingthese interpretations presume a significant probability of a final
affirmative dumping determination. In contrast, the significant possibility of a dumping fmding
is not a prerequisite for the investigation effects under the third interpretation offered above. This
is because the investigation effect under this third interpretation comes in the form of a threat to
"punish" foreign firms with an antiduxnping duty jf they should "misbehave" and compete too
aggressively during the investigation period. Such a threat is made credible by filing the petition;
because it is credible the threatened duties need never be implemented.Thus, under this
interpretation, domestic firms may value the price-competition-dampening effects of antidumping
investigations discussed above for their own sake. Hence, these firms may file such petitions
with no expectation that they would actually result in duties or other remedies, but only to ensure
that the foreign firms do not engage in aggressive pricing behavior during the investigation phase.
Finally, neither is the significant probability of a dumping finding necessarily a prerequisite for
the withdrawal effect, if domestic firms value Noerr-Pennington exemption from antitrust
sufficiently for its own sake, presumably because of the coordination benefits offered by such an
exemption.
We will therefore consider the possibility of both outcome and process filers in our
empirical work. Outcome filers file antidumping petitions when their chances of securing a
dumping determination are sufficiently strong. The investigation effect associated with such filers
14should correspond to the first two interpretations depicted above: the flow of imports should rise
upon filing and fall at the point of an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination, remaining low
until the conclusion of the investigation. Process filers file antidumping petitions without regard
to their chances of securing a dumping determination, but rather when the risks of competitive
price wars are sufficiently severe. In Staiger and Wolak (1991), we argued that this occurs when
capacity utilization falls below a critical level, and thus we will consider the role of capacity
utilization as a predictor of the filing activity of process filers. The investigation effects
associated with process filers should correspond to the third interpretation depicted above: the
flow of imports should fall upon filing and remain low until the conclusion of the investigation.
Finally, the withdrawal effect could be associated with either filing strategy, with no a priori
difference across outcome or process filers.
3. The Effects of Antidumping Duties Alone
We begin our empirical investigation into the effects of antidumping law by focusing on
the duty effects alone. This is a natural starting point for assessing the impacts of antidumping
law, and it will provide a benchmark for results of the broader investigation that follows.
To investigate the impact of the imposition of duties on the flow of imports and domestic
output, we must first describe the data sources used for all of the empirical work reported in this
paper. We then describe the econometric framework used to measure these impacts. Finally, we
present a model of industry-level antidumping suit filings and estimates of the import-restricting
effects and output-promoting effects of the imposition of antidumping duties.
Data Sources
15The source of data for the industry-level economic magnitudes is the National Bureau of
Economic Research Trade Data File. Abowd (1990) gives a detailed description of this data set.
It contains domestic shipments, imports and exports information for 450 U.S. manufacturing
industries by 4-digit 1972 Standard Industry Code (SIC) from 1958 to 1985. It also contains
information on various industry-level economic aggregates such as the level of employment and
the size of the capitaJ stock, as well as an industry-level output price deflator. We use this price
deflator to convert all nominal dollar magnitudes to 1972 dollars.
The data source for information on the filing date for all antidumping suits and the dates
for the subsequentstages ofthe suit resolution process is the National Technical Information
Service's Trade Action MonitorinR System (TAMS') Pending jnvesti2ation Report. This
publication is produced by the Department of Commerce and is issued on a monthly basis. It
tracks all petitions having to do with the 1974 Trade Act, such as escape clause (section 201),
antidumping (section 731), countervailing duties (section 303) and unfair practices in import trade
(section 337). Each month it lists the current disposition of each petition until its final
determination. Firms file antidumping petitions alleging dumping of specific imported products.
For purposes of the investigation, the ITC then links the products under investigation to Tariff
Schedules of the United States (TSUS) product codes. Thus, for each petition the TAMS dataset
records the TSUS codes for the products which are allegedly being dumped and the petition's
disposition in the current month. We explicitly account for filing sit the TSUS product code level
in our econometric model of the suit filingprocess and in our model of the impacts of
antidumping suits on imports and domestic output flows.
16As noted above, our industry-level data is available at the 4-digit1972SIC level.
Consequently we must have a concordance between the TSUS codes and the 4-digit 1972 SICs
both to assign antidumping suits to SIC industries and to determine the total number of TSUS
product codes in each SIC industry. We obtain a year-by-year concordance between TSUS
product codes and 1972 SICs from the Commerce Department's Foreign Trade Division Imnorts
Extract Master Concordance. This concordance allows us to assign each antidumping suit filed
to a 4-digit SIC industry. Because TSUS codes are based on traded products and SIC code
assignments are based on a firm's principal productive activities, several SIC industries do not
have any TSUS codes associated with them during our sample. Consequently, a necessary
requirement for an SIC-industry to appear in our dataset is that it contains at least one TSIJS
product code for each year during our sample. Only four industries were deleted from the sample
because they had no TSUS code in them for only a portion of the sample time period. Most of
the industries omitted had no TSUS codes in them for all years. This concordance procedure left
a total of 338 industries for our time period of 1980-1985.
Our empirical work focuses on 1980 to 1985, because major changes in the structure of
U.S. antidumping law occurred with the passage of The Trade Agreement Act of 1979.
Modifications of this act were made by The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, but none of these are
directly relevant to the aspects of the administrative process we consider in our research.
Econometric Model
There are several aspects of the economic environment we are modeling that our
econometric model should capture. The first is the joint determination of the decision to file an
antidumping suit with the level of imports and domestic output We model the contemporaneous
17correlation between the level of imports and domestic output and the decision to file an
antidumping suit by the presence of an unobservable industry characteristic which affects the
mean of each of these three variables. Our econometric model allows for contemporaneous
correlations among these three variables as well as correlation over time among these three
variables. Because our model uses functions of lagged values of the levels of imports and
domestic output as regressors to predict antidumping suit filing activity, we must account for the
correlation between these functions of lagged dependent variables and the autocorrelation in the
error terms of the suit filings model, or the resulting parameter estimates will be inconsistent.
The suit filing process has several characteristics which we attempt to capture in our
econometric model. First is the fact that antidumping suits are filed at the TSUS code level
although all of our remaining data is at the 4-digit SIC level. Consequently, we must construct
a model which will allow us to recover information about the TSUS code-level filing process
using SIC industry-level data as regressors for the filing rate process. The number of filings in
a given TSUS code is a non-negative discrete-valued random variable which is zero for most time
periods, but in the periods in which it is nonzero, it can take on large values. We select a
discrete distribution for the TSUS code-level number of antidumping suit filings which allows
for this large positive skew in the distribution of filings for a given industry. There are both
observable and unobservable reasons for high levels of filihg activity which persist over time.
For this reason, we include an unobservable industry-specific propensity to file suits which also
affects the level of imports and output from the competing domestic industry. In addition, to
match the industry-level aggregation of our import and domestic output data, we need a
18distribution for TSUS level filings which can be aggregated to the 4-digit SIC level in an
empirically tractable manner.
Although the suit filing equation is necessary to account for the correlation between suit
filing activity and both imports and domestic output, this equation is of independent interest. At
the most basic level, because several characteristics of the industry's health are used to detennine
injury in an antidumping proceeding, one would expect that these variables should also predict
whether or not a firm files a suit. Consequently, our first motivation for estimating the filing
equation is to determine if variables used to assess injury to an industry also predict filing by this
industry. A second motivation is the relative importance of each of these variables in the
decision to file an antidumping suit. A final motivation for estimating our ffling equation is the
potential existence, as outlined in the preceding section, of two distinct antidumping suit filing
strategies. These strategies each imply a different set of predictors of future filing activity and
different impacts of the various stages of the suit resolution process on domestic output and
imports. In Section 5weinvestigate the plausibility to these two filing strategies by imposing
the appropriate exclusion restrictions on the two filing equations and allow for the impacts of the
suit resolution process on imports and domestic output to differ across the two filing strategies.
As discussed earlier, we would like to measure the impacts of various stages of the
antidumping suit resolution process on the flow of imports and domestic output To do this in
a consiátent manner, several characteristics of the suit resolution process must be accounted for.
As is evident from our description of the investigation process in Section 2, a single antidumping
investigation can straddle more than a single year, while each of the various stages of the process
last only a fraction of a year. In addition, several antidumping suits can be simultaneously active
19in a single TSUS code because of filing against the same product imported from different
countries. Finally, we face the difficulty that our data on imports and domestic output are only
available on an annual basis at the 4-digit SIC level. Consequently, we must speci a model
which will allow us to recover the TSUS code-level impacts on the flows of imports and
domestic output from stages of the suit resolution process which may run over adjacent years or
for a fraction of a year, accounting for the possibility of multiple filings from the same TSUS
code, using data which is time-aggregated to annual magnitudes and cross-sectionally aggregated
to the 4-digit SIC industry level. Our TSUS code-level, within-year flow model provides a
framework for us to recover within-year effects from annual import and domestic output levels
using indexes of suit activity in that year.
Our SIC industry-level model of the filing rate process and the impacts of the suit
resolution process can be interpreted without reference to the underlying TSUS code-level
processes. However, our bottom-up approach, starting with a TSUS code-level model which has
not been time-aggregated to the annual magnitudes, specifies an econometric model at the level
of both time and product aggregation at which the true underlying processes are occurring. It is
then both time- and product-aggregated to an industry-level model. This modeling strategy
allows the recovery of both TSUS code and industry level impacts because the industry-level
model is obtained from the explicit aggregation of the TSUS code-level model.
We now describe the details of our econometric model of dumping suit filing behavior
and its impacts on the level of imports and domestic output. Let L_ be the number of
antidumping suits filed in industry i for good g in period t, where g=l,...,Q., t1,...,T and
20il,...,N. Because antidumping suits are filed at the TSUS code level, for the purposes of this
paper a good is defmed to be TSUS product code.
Let X.,, denote the rate at which suits are filed in industry i for good g in period t. We
assume that the distribution of f given A is Poisson (P(A)) with parameter A=A. We denote
this fact using the notation
f,A
—P(A). (1)
These assumptions are consistent with f being a Poisson point process for the time interval t to
+ 1.
We further assume that X., possesses a gsmma distribution FQs a), where Ift =exppçy
+ 0j. The vector X, contains the observable characteristics of industry i as of the beginning time
which affect its filing rate; the vector y and the scalar a are parameters to be estimated. The
variable O is the unobservable propensity of firms in industry ito file antidumping suits. There
are many unobservable or non-quantifiable reasons why one industry may have a larger number
of filings than another industry. We account for this unobservable difference in behavior across
industries by O. We assume that O is independently and identically distributed across industries
and remains constant over time. Using our above notation we have:
—r(expcKy÷0),a). (2)
Assumption (2) implies that each product class within industry i and in time period thas a
different mean rate of filing (AJ,althoughall of these filing rates are drawn from the same
gamma distribution.
21Combining assumptions (I) and (2), we have
4X1,O—P(X) (3_r(exp(47+8),a), (3)
denotescompounding or mixing the parameterof the Poisson distribution with
a gamma distribution r(ex'y + 01),a). Results from Johnson and Kotz (1969, Chapter 5),
imply that f1 has a negative binomial distribution with parameters a and =expQ'y+ 0j.
We abbreviate this as f —NB(a,pJ.This discrete density takes the following form:
pr(f,,, =k] =[a;k']uxt(1 +4)40').
(4)
We assume that conditional on 8, f is independent offor all g h, i * j,ands * t.
This distribution for f has the following properties. The mean is agk and the varance
is a(l+jsj. The parameter a effects shape the density of. If op1 <(1 + j.Q,thenthe mode
of f is zero. A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold isa< I. The smaller a becomes,
the greater the probability associated with the event=0. Larger values of p, increase the
relative probability associated with larger values r The mode of the density is increasing in ap1,
-(1+ J.LJforag >(I+t.a). Becauseantiduinping filings are a relatively rare event, we expect
a to be substantially less than one, reflecting the fact that f =0is a highly probable event.
Our data generation process captures the following logic. In each period t, X,1 the filing
rate for product class g in industry i is drawn from a f(exp(X1'y + 0J,a) distribution. Conditional
22on this draw of X and the value of O, the actual filing behavior for an individual product class
evolves according to a Poisson process with rate ?. This compound distribution model allows
for differences in filing rates across product classes within an industry while at the same time
imposing the restriction that, on the average, all products within an industry file at the same rate.
From our estimation procedure we can recover estimates of the parameters of both the distribution
F(exp(X11'y +81),a)and the filing Poisson process conditional on the realized value of A.gu.
Thefiling of an antidumping suit is a rare event, but when it occurs there tends to be
clustering in the number of filings. For our sample of 2028 industry and year observations (338
industries times 6 years), only 122 have non-zero values of antidumping suit activity. However,
there can be large amounts of product-level filing activity, on the order of hundreds of TSUS
product codes, in a given industry and year. Within the context of our econometric model we
can think of this clustering of suits as caused by the positive skewness in the gamma distribution
for X1, so that most realizations of the rate of the Poisson process are very small. However, a
large realization occurs very rarely, which in turn implies a large number of observed filings.
In addition, the unobserved heterogeneity across industries represented by 0. allows for a much
larger (or smaller) level of filing activity from a given industry than is predicted by its observable
characteristics. Both the stoehastic nature of the mean filing rate and the unobservable industry-
level heterogeneity in the filing rate allow for a substantial amount of variability in the TSUS
code product-level filing rates across industries.
To compute f, the total number of suits filed within industry i during period t, we sum




Thisindustry-levelannual amount of filing activity is the observabledependent variableused to
estimate theparameters y and a and the across-industry distribution of heterogeneity go).
To construct the conditional densityof f.given01,we utilize thefact thatthe sumoftwo
independentNB(a43) randomvariablesisNB(2a,).Thisimplies that fft possesses a negative
binomial distributionwithparametersGa and=exp(X11'y + 0),conditional onthe value of
0,.Consequently, the conditional distribution of given 0 observation is
prO] = exp(f,(Xjy+)) (I+exp(X,'y+ (6)
where['(a) is the gamma function F(a) =
tic1
- 'e"di.





24where pr[f'ej is defmed in (6). Henceforth let &1,...,T6, denote the years 1980-1985.
We now turn to our model of the impact of antidumping duties on industry-level imports
and output which is linked to the model of filing activity through the unobserved industry
propensity for filing, 0. We first specib' the product class import equation and output prediction
equations and then aggregate these to obtain the industry-level equations. Let IMP denote the
level of imports for product class g in industry i in time period t. Let OUTS denote the level of
output produced domestically in product class g in industry i in time period t. We treat time
period t as the interval of time [t, t + I).
As discussed above, because our goal is to measure the within-year effects of the stages
of the antidumping suit resolution process from annual magnitudes, we first specify a model for
the rate of imports within any given year which incorporates how each of the stages of the suit
resolution process impacts the rate of imports and domestic output. We then aggregate these two
within-year flow equations to obtain the annual level of imports and domestic output. This
aggregation process produces indexes of annual suit activity consistent with our model of import
and domestic output flows. Aggregating these ThUS code-level annual level equations over all
products in each 4-digit SIC yields equations which can be estimated using our industry-level
data. This across-product aggregation process clarifies precisely how our industry-level annual
indexes of dumping suit activity are constructed from the product-level indexes.
Our within-year model of the impacts of antidumping duties assumes that for any year (t)
and industry (I), the following linear differential equations characterize the instantaneous annual
rate of change in the real value of imports and domestic output at the Thuscode-level:
25dJMF gil= ++ ri + e(m) (8)
ClOUT,=p ofl, ++ p 71g?'t) + e(o). (9)
where j3k,(k=m,o)are coefficients quantiing the impact of the unobservable industry
heterogeneity on the rate of change of the real value of imports and output in industry i for all
time and ,(k=m,o)are fixed time effects for the two rates of change for year t. The variable
JOGD(5)countsthe number of currently ongoing antidumping duties (001)) for all s E[t,t÷1)
in product class g in industry i and time period t. The coefficients p1k,(k=o,m)quantir the
impact of a one unit change in these count variables on the annual rate of imports and domestic
output for good g in industry i during time period t. The variables e,1(k), (leo,m) are
independent identically distributed shocks to the rate of imports and output for product class g,
in industry i, in period t. We assume that the disturbance vector e =( e(m),e,(ofY possesses
a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix I. We assume that e8 is
independently and identically distributed across goods, industries and over time.
As discussed in the previous section, the hA must find sales at less than fair value and
the ITC must find injury due to dumped imports in order for a dumping duty to be imposed and,
hence, in order for l°°°(s) to take on a positive value. Both of these decisions are made by
established administrative procedures which do not depend on the specific domestic industry
under consideration. Consequently, we would not expect the treatment of individual firms by
26these administrative procedures to depend on O, the unobserved propensity of firms in industry
i to file antidumping suits. For the purposes of our econometric model this neutrality of the
resolution process with respect to the specific domestic industry under consideration implies that
6, industry i's unobserved filing propensity, is independent of J°°°(s), which reflects the joint
decision of the ITA and JTC to impose antidumping duties. Although the actual operation of the
suit resolution process favors this econometric assumption, to specify a model which allows for
the possible correlation between the decision of ITC and ITA to impose duties and O would
require specifying and estimating a model of the various stages of suit resolution process of these
two agencies. Such a model would have to predict both outcome and the duration of each stage
of the suit resolution process because both of these factors enter into the construction of the
annual indexes of industry-level antidumping suit activity used in our econometric model of
imports and domestic output. Given the complex nature of each of these administrative
processes, we leave this difficult task to future research.
To clarify how the imposition of antidumping duties impacts the quantity of imports and
domestic output, consider the following example. Suppose that no antidumping duties are
currently imposed on imports from product class g in industry i during year t. In this case the
rate of imports in product class g in industry i is
dIMFgs= ++ e (m). (10)
Suppose that antidumping duties are imposed on imports in this product class sometime during
period t. The variable I°°°(s) will then take on the value 1 for all s e [t,t+l) such that
27antidumping duties are currently active. Consequently, the rate of imports will increase by the
value of f3 because duties are currently active for that product class. Should another set of
duties be imposed on imports within this product class during the same time interval, then
100D(5) wilt take on the value 2 for as long as both sets of duties are active; it will return to the
value of 1 when a single set of duties is again active and zero when no duties are active.'6
Continuing with the derivation of our TSUS product code-level import and output
equations, we integrate (8) and (9) with respect to s from t to t + I to obtain




= ++ POGDM+e(o) (12)
discussion in Section 2 characterized the impacts of the duties and other stages of the
suit resolution process in terms of the quantity of imports and domestic output at the 7-digit
TSUS level. Our data on imports, domestic output, and the industry-level output price deflator
are at the 4-digit SIC level. Thus, data limitations preclude us from deriving an index of the
quantity of output at the 4-digit SIC level. To do this would require prices and revenue shares
for all of the 7-digit TSUS products in each of the 4-digit SIC industries. As a result, our
estimates reflect real value effects as opposed to quantity effects. So long as the elasticity of
demand for each of these products is larger than one in absolute value, the quantity effects and
value effects should go in the same direction. The assumption of elastic demand for goods
produced by these domestic industries and their foreign competitors is consistent with available
empirical evidence. Consequently, our empirical results are useful to test the sign predictions of
our theories concerning impacts of the various stages of the suit resolutionprocess on the quantity
of imports and domestic output in spite ofour use of the real'value of imports and output data
28"I
whereOGDg= j !°7(s)dc.In order to compute industry-level import and output equations
from these product-level equations, we must aggregate over all of the product classes g within
industry i in period t. Summing over all g yields:
IMP_ = + Cd1+7OGD1 + (13)




=E IMPgü' E OUT,, OdD1 = E OGD and;(k) =E e,(k),
g-I g1 g-l g—l
forIc =m,o.This aggregation procedure implies that ib =( 1(m),th(o))'is N(O,GkE) so that 1h
is heteroscedastic conditional on Oft. Dividing (13) and (14) by O yields a model more
amenable to estimation. This form of the model is analogous to the conventional fixed time-
effects, random individual effects panel data model. The model is
IMFJG1 =+ jm)/Q and O(J7'JQ1 =+ ;(o)/CI,, (15)
29where =p'e,++ [37OGDJGfr and : = P°O,++ POGDJGk. (16)
The variables jib"andi? are the conditional means of the normalized annual imports and output
from industry i in period t. The normalized duty count variable can now be interpreted as an
intensity of suit activity. The normalized error vector JG11 is still heteroscedastic because of the
distribution for n given above. Consequently, we apply the appropriate weighting scheme in the
construction of the likelihood function.
Several comments are in order about the structure of our econometric model. First, an
assumption implicit in equations (15) and (16) is that [3' and Is?,thecoefficients measuring the
impact of the imposition of a duty on the flow of imports and domestic output, are the same
across all products and industries. We experimented with random coefficient assumptions for
these impact coefficients, where the coefficient for each industry is assumed to be a drawn from
an unknown distribution. However, we did not find that this modeling strategy resulted in
statistically superior description of the data. An alternative strategy to constructing OGD, our
index of dumping duty activity within an industry, would be to weight OGD by the share of
industry level imports or domestic output which is made up of each specific TSUS code product
However, value weighting in this manner is inconsistent with our underlying TSUS code within-
year model of the impacts of antidumping duties. We would be weighting each 000II by a
function of either IMPS or OUTS, both of which are functions of O and er Hence, within the
context of our model, this would imply contemporaneous correlation between the regressors, the
30import- or output-weighted indexes of duty activity, and the error terms in the import and output
equations thus rendering our coefficient estimates inconsistent.'7
Because we assume that G is known at the beginning of each year. aggregating over the
number of TSUS codes within a given 4-digit SIC does not impart any correlation between OOD
and 0 or OGDk and Cr So long as we assume that the probability that duties are imposed given
that a suit has been filed does not depend on 81, our estimation procedure will yield consistent
estimates of 137and1?•
Usingour distributional assumptions we can construct the joint density of IMP? =
(IMP/G11,...,WW1G)'and OUT' =(OUT411G11,...,OUTfl/Gff)' conditionalonas follows.
Conditional on the value of 01, the joint density of the two-dimensional vector
(IMPJG,,,OUT1/Gj is
4(IMF JO, OUTJG,01 )= .J_:a;'z exp(—l/2(v,(GEv1)), (17)
where v((IMP,,/0 -i.t), (OUTJG1-j4))'.Thisimplies that the joint density of
(IMP1*,OUT1*)? conditional on 8 is
have also estimated normalized import and output equations analogous to (15) but with
the import-penetration ratio and the capacity utilization rate on the left-hand-side rather than
imports and output Although there is no consistent method of aggregation from the product-code
level that would generate such models, the results from their estimation are qualitatively similar
to the results we report here.
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h(JMP,O(J7'0,) =H +(JMPJGU,OUTJG, 8,). (18)
Combiningthis joint density with the joint density of filings over the sample period yields the
following joint density of filings, output and imports over our sample period conditional on
g(f,JMP,OUT, 0)=h(JMF,'OUT,O)prg 0,). (19)
To complete the construction of the unconditionaljoint density offilings, output, andimports
over our sample period for any industry we must integrate this conditional density with respect
tothe density of the of 0. We choose a discrete factor approximation to this unknown density.
Recent Monte Carlo work by Mroz and (luilkey (1991) has found these discrete factor structures
are able to model a wide-variety of potential heterogeneity distributions. For many models
involving discrete and continuous endogenous variables the parameters of the conditional
distribution of interest estimated from these models were found to dominate those obtained from
the maximum likelihood estimator in terms of mean squared error loss for sample sizes
considered. Integrating with respect to this discrete density of 8, (it1,0J k=1,...,K, where K is the
number of points of support of the discrete density and ktheprobability associated with the
point of support 0k'yields
=if,IMP,,our,1 0). (20)
32Taking thelog of p(fj,IMP1*,OUT1*)and slimmingfrom1=1 to N yields the log-likelihood
function for our model.Forall of our estimation results we found that past K =2,theparameter
estimatesof the three conditional mean functions and their standard error estimates did not
change appreciably. Consequently, all results reported in this paper are conditional on the value
K =2for the number of points of support of the assumed discrete distribution for e.Intheir
Monte Carlo study, Mroz and Guilkey (1991) also found that only a small number of points of
support are necessary to adequately estimate the parameters of economic interest.
We summarize by describing the essential features of the joint density of1MP1,and
OUT1' captured by our econometric modeling framework. This model allows correlation over
time between all six elements of each these three vectors and between any element of these three
vectors and all other elements in the remaining two vectors. Consequently, a fairly rich class of
correlation structures between these 18 variables (3 vectors of 6 elements) can be accounted for
in estimating the parameters of the conditional mean functions of these three variables using our
modeling framework.
We now discuss the variables entering X1, the vector of observable industry characteristics
shifting the conditional mean of the filing rate of industry i and time period t. Ourmain
objective in selecting variables for inclusion inX follows from the logic that if avariable is used
to determine injury in an antidumping suit proceeding and industries are aware of this, thenthese
variables should be predictors of future dumping suit activity. As discussed in Section 2,
although the domestic industry must concern itself with the establishment of iiury, adetermina-
tion of LTFV sales by the foreign firm is also necessary for dumping to be found. Moreover,
the margin by which the Commerce Department finds that final sales to the domestic market are
33made at less than fair value determines the magnitude of the antidumping duties that the
petitioning industry can expect. Nevertheless, the Commerce Department's final LTFV margin
is extremely unpredictable and there are biases inherent in the process used to determine its level
which favor finding a positive margim This uncertainty is due in part to the different
methodologies, sometimes for a single suit, that can be used to determine this margin. Boltuck
and Litan (1991) contains several papers which discuss the large amount of uncertainty inherent
in the dumping margin determination process. In addition, a conclusion which is fairly consistent
throughout most of the papers in this volume is that there are strong biases in the process towards
fmding a positive dumping margin. The two papers by Francois, Palmeter, and Anspacher and
Boltuck, Francois, and Kaplan in the Boltuck and Litan (1991) volume are particularly persuasive
in this regard. For all of these reasons, we hypothesize that firms file primarily based on the
observable industry characteristics that determine injury, and allow for a sufficiently rich
stochastic structure for our model to account for unobservable differences in filing behavior
across industries.
A major indicator of injury to the petitioning firms is the import penetration ratio IMPENE
=!MPJ(IMP,+OUTa.A large value of IMPEN is indicative of a large foreign presence in the
domestic market which may be injurious to the domestic firms. A second variable which is used
to assess injury is the domestic firm's capacity utilization rate, which we represent at the industry
level by CAPUk =OUT1JCAP1(where °1"Misreal shipments and CAPft is real capital stock).
We compute OIJTh as the nominal value of annual shipments divided by the industry specific
shipments price index. All real magnitudes are in 1972 dollars. We include IMPEN11.1 and
CAPU.1inbecause they are both predetermined as of the beginningofyear t. We also
34include time fixed effects in ; toaccount for any trends in filing activity not accounted by
changes in observableorunobservableindustrycharacteristics.
Finally, we include several additional variables to account for the fact that the magnitude
of IMPEN and CAPU necessary to fmd harmful dumping may vary with the size and the
structure of the domestic industry. We measure the size of an industry by EMP aggregate
employment for industry i in period t, and expect that a given level of IMPEN and CAPU is
more likely to be associated with a fmding of injury the larger the size of the industry. We
attempt to proxy for the (vertical) structhre of an industry by value-added per dollar of output
in the industry, VADD.JOUT., and expect that a given level of IMPEN and CAPU is more likely
to be associated with a fmding of injury to the domestic industry the lower is VADD/OUT, i.e.,
the farther downstream the domestic industry is located, and thus the smaller the share of primary
factor payments in total industry cost and the more sensitive those factor payments will be to
industry price changes. Because they are predetermined at the beginning of year t, lagged values
of VADD/OUT and EMP (their values for period t -1) are included in Xft.
Before describing our results, we should note some properties of our econometric model.
Three of the variables in X are functions of lagged values of IMP1 and OUTW The presence of
O in the IMP.1 and OUT1 equations implies that IMPENM, CAPUIkI and
VADD.1/OUT which are elements of; in jift= expQCjy+Oa,are each functions of 8.
However, the Jacobian of the transformation from the vector of composite disturbances to the 4
IMP,and OUT1t equations (each of which contain 0) to the vector (41MP1,OUT1) is
triangular with l's along the diagonal, its determinant is equal to one. Consequently, our
likelihood function correctly accounts for this correlation between the regressors and error term
35in the filing rate equations, so that the maximum likelihood estimates are consistent estimates of
the true parameter values.
Table 1 contains the sample means and standard errors for all of the variables used in our
analysis. The most noticeable aspect of this table is the large, relative to their means, standard
errors associated with the number of filings and the various indexes of suit activity given in the
lower rows of the table. This is consistent with the "rare event" nature of antidumping suit
activity. Mother aspect of note is the large amount of across-industry variability in the number
of TSUS codes per industry. Although the mean number of TSUS codes in 33.63, the standard
error indicates a substantial amount of variability in this number across industries and over time.
As mentioned above, all dollar magnitudes are in real 1972 dollars.
Results
The first column of Table 2 presents estimates of the parameters of the filing rate
equation. The first column of Tables 3 and 4 presents estimates of the parameters of the
conditional mean functions given in (16) which are used assess the impact of duties on the flow
of both imports and domestic output. Consistent with our "outcome filer" strategy, we fmd that
the conditional mean of filings changes in the predicted manner due to changes in any of the four
regressors. For example, higher filing rates are associated with industries that exhibit higher
import penetration ratios, lower capacity utilization, higher employment and lower shares of
primary factor payments in total costs. As indicated by the very small value of a, the density of
filing implied by our model is extremely positively skewed. Recall that in our mixture model
interpretation of the density of filings, the filing rate X is drawn from a flexp(X'y +O),a)
distribution. The estimated value of a implies a very positively skewed distribution of filing
36rates, where for most goods and time periods, the filing rate is very small, but with a small
probability a very large ,canbe drawn which results in a high level of filing activity during
that period. Because E(f&J =exppç'y)E(exp(e))aimplies ln(E(çj) = + ln(E(exp(e))+
Ln(a),the elements of y, when multiplied by the corresponding element of X, have the interpreta-
tion of elasticities of the expected number of filings with respect to that element of X.
Evaluating these elasticities for IMPEN and CAPU at the sample means given in Table I yields
values of 0.43 and -0.98. In other words, if the value of IMPEN is 1 percent higher for one
industry relative to another, then expected number of filings in the current year should be 0.43
percent higher for this industry, assuming the value of IMPENS, for other industry is the sample
mean of IMPEN. This same elasticity calculation for EMP and VADD/OUT yields 0.38 and -
1.53.
Turning to the effects of antidumping duties on imports and domestic output, the
coefficient associated with COD in Table 3 implies that the imposition of an antidumping duty
on a single TSUS code predicts a reduction of 10.55 million 1972 dollars in the annual rate of
imports. This same antidumping duty predicts an increase of 7.13 million 1972 dollars in the
annual rate of domestic output in this import-competing product, although this output effect is
too imprecisely estimated to place much confidence in this value.
4. Investigation, Suspension, and WithdrawalEffects
Whilethe results reported in Tables 2-4 provide estimates of the import and domestic
output effects of antiduinping duties, we have argued above that this yields an understanding of
37the trade effects of antidumping law which is incomplete at best. We now develop an expanded
econometric framework which will allow us to analyze the broader effects of antiduinping law.
Econometric Model
To quantify the magnitudes of the effects on imports and domestic output of the various
stages of the antidumping suit filing process we characterize the jointdistribution of f,IMP1' and
OUT with the same framework used to assess the impact of duties only. However, the
conditional mean functions for the industry level imports and outputs now include accumulated
index variables similar to OGD1 for the other stages of the antidumping suit filing process. In
light of the discussion in Section 2 we quantify the impacts of (1) filing an antidumping suit,
(ii) an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination, and (lii) the various post-investigation
outcomes. In particular, we attempt to quantify the differential impact on imports and domestic
output from suits ending in (a) duties, (b) suspension, and (c) withdrawal. Suits ending in a
negative determination are taken to have no lasting impact on subsequent imports and domestic
Qutput.
In this case the conditional mean of our industry level output and import equations are
based on the additional indicator variables 1(s), (k=OGP, OGPLFV, OGSUS, and OGWD)
which count, respectively, the number of currently ongoing antidumping petitions (OGP), ongoing
affirmative preliminary LTFV determinations (OGPLFV), ongoing suspended suits (OUSUS), and
ongoing withdrawn suits (OGWD) for all a E [t,t+l) in product class g in industry i and time
period t. The indicator variable j00E'(5) turns on at the filing date of the suit and remains on
until the suit's final disposition date. The indicator variable I&100P12v(s) remains on from the date
of the affirmative preliminary LTFV decision until the suit's final disposition date. The final
38disposition of the suit is detennined by one of the following four events: (I) a negative final
determination, (2) the imposition of duties, (3) the suspension of the investigation, or (4) the
withdrawal of the suit by the petitioner. Using this variable we can construct the integrated,
industry-aggregate indexes of activity in each of these portions of the suit filing process for year
t. For the same reasons given for Io0)(s) in Section 3, we maintain the assumption that O,
industry i's unobserved filing propensity, is independent of I'(s) for the additional indicator
variables (k=OGP, OGPLFV, OGSUS, and OGWD) as well.
In terms of this new notation the normalized conditional mean import and output functions
become:
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=
39Each of these four variables withoutthe gsubscript given in (21) and (22) is the sum of that
variable over the G, TSUS products in industry i for yeart. The coefficients ,(j=l,2...5and
k=o,m) quantify the impact of a one unit change in these count variables on the rate of imports
and output in industry i during time period t.Assumingthe same distribution for rjdefined
earlier, the likelihood function for this model is identical to the one given in (20) except for the
expanded set of regressors in the conditional mean function for the normalized level of imports
and domestic output.
Results
The estimates of the parameters of the filing equation obtained from jointly estimating this
equation with our expanded model for the conditional mean of imports and domestic output do
not differ very much from the estimates in the first column of Table 2 in terms of their signs and
magnitudes or the precision with which they are estimated. Consequently, we omit these results,
and simply note that they are again consistent with our "outcome filer" interpretation of filing
behavior. The elasticities of the expected number of filings with respect to changes in any of the
four variables evaluated at the sample mean of the vector of regressors are: IMPEN, 0.455;
CAPU, -0.876; EMP, 0.376, and VADD/OUT, -1.66.
The results in the second column of Tables 3 and 4 shed some light on the importance
of the non-duty impacts of antidumping law discussed earlier. In particular, in the second column
of Table 3, we find fairly precisely estimated import effects for the stages of the investigation
process included in our estimation. Consistent with the "outcome filer" interpretation of
investigation effects, we fmd a slight acceleration of imports with the filing of an antidumping
petition. The major reduction in the flow of imports occurs with the finding of a positive
40preliminary LTFVdetermination. This affirmative determination is predicted to reduce the
annual flow of imports relative to the pre-suit base rate of imports by 25.36 million 1972 dollars
(33.81 -8.45).If the petition is suspended, then the annual rate of imports as a result of the
suspension agreement is predicted to be 29.57 million 1972 dollars below the pre-petition base
rate. The imposition of duties predicts a similar reduction in the annual rate of imports (24.95
million 1972 dollars) to that accompanying a suspension agreement. However, a suit ending in
withdrawal predicts no statistically significant change in the flow of imports relative to the base
level of imports for that industry and time period. The output effects in the second column of
Table 4 are largely opposite in sign and smaller in absolute value, but less precisely estimated
than those for the import equation. Together, these results are consistent with the view that
temporary protection from imports and a proportionately smaller increase in domestic output is
a typical outcome of an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination, even if the suit does not
end in duties. The first column of Figure 5 reports the point estimate of this net (sum of imports
and domestic output) effect obtained by adding analogous suit activity coefficients in the second
column of Tables 3 and 4.
-
Figures2 through 5providedepictions of the import, output, and the sum of imports and
output effects of various hypothetical petitions according to our estimation results. The figures,
which are meant only to be suggestive of the kind of import and output effects that might
accompany an antidumping investigation, are constructed under the assumption that the
preliminary LTFV determination occurs 5 months into the investigation, suspensions (if they
occur at all) occur 10 months into the investigation, and final determinations (if they occur at all)
occur at the end of the 12th month of the investigation. These timing assumptions approximate
41the statutory limits imposed on the different phases of the investigation process in the absence
of "extraordinary complications" (see note 6). We use the coefficient estimates given in the
second columns Tables 3,4, and 5 to compute the cumulative impact on imports, output and the
sum of imports and domestic output. Because the coefficient estimates for OGWD1/G were
never significantly different from zero, we do not use our point estimates to illustrate theeffects
of a withdrawn petition. All hypothetical petitions depicted in the figures are filed in month 6
and, if they run the full course of the investigation, have a fmal determination 1 year later in
month 18. All import and output effects are measured as deviations from zero.
Figure 2 depicts the case of an investigation which had an affirmative preliminary LTFV
determination and a duty imposed after the final determination. According to our estimates in
Table 3, filing would lead imports to rise above their baseline until the date of preliminary LTFV
determination, at which point imports begin falling. By the seventh month of the investigation,
the import level is back down to its baseline level, and continues to drop below baseline for the
remaining 5 months of the investigation. Duty imposition at the end of 12 months then leads
essentially to a continuation of the level of protection afforded over the last seven months of the
investigation. Thus, as Figure 2 makes clear, our point estimates suggest that the investigation
effects restrict trade from the date of an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination forward as
if the expected antidumping duties were put in place on that date. Given that this accounts for
a bit more than half of the statutory investigation period, and that the first five months of the
investigation see a small rise in imports, we conclude that a petitioning firm can expect to receive
roughly half the import relief during the period of investigation that it would have received if
antidumping duties had been imposed from the date of filing. This is illustrated by comparing
42Figure 3, which depicts the import effects of a petition whose preliminary LTFV determination
is affirmative butwhosefinal determination is negative, with Figure 4, which depicts the effect
on the level of imports if an antidumping duty had been imposed on the date of filing. Figure
5depictsthe import effects of a suspension agreement. As noted above, our point estimates
suggest that suspension agreements are at least as restrictive of imports as would be the
imposition of antidumping duties. These same figures paint qualitatively the exact opposite
picture with respect to domestic output.
For the sum of both imports and domestic output, Figures 2-5 all show that although the
domestic output is enhanced by the same stages of the suit resolution process that restrict imports
and is restricted by those stages that enhance imports, the net effect on the sum of imports and
domestic output is, for the most part, dominated by the import effect. For example, in Figure
2, the net effect of the filing of a petition is a slight acceleration in the sum of imports and
domestic output, because the surge in imports is larger in absolute value than the drop in
domestic output, although the standard error estimates in the second column of Table 5 shown
that this net effect is imprecisely estimated. However, the net effects of both an affirmative
preliminary LTFV decision and the imposition of a dumping duty are fairly precisely estimated
to be negative, with the trade restricting effect dominating the domestic output enhancing effect
in both cases. The net effect of a suspension agreement is also precisely estimated to be negative.
Consequently, the net effect of the various stages of the suit resolution process and suit outcomes
in Figures 2-5 is a reduction in the sum of imports and domestic output. These net results are
consistent with the view that the suit resolution process, the presence of suspension agreements,
and the imposition of duties all result in net losses in domestic consumer welfare.
435. Investigation Effects with Both ProcessandOutcome Filers
The results of the previous section appear to tvor the outcome filing strategy over the
process filing strategy. However, one would expect the process filing strategy to be the far less
common strategy which, if used, should be used by industries which are able to maintain "orderly
competition" in their domestic market and can coordinate (either through a strong industry
association or small numbers) to agree to file antidumping suits in periods of sufficiently low
capacity utilization. We would expect this filing strategy to be more difficult to pursue by
industries characterized by large numbers of firms without a strong industry association. Such
necessary conditions for the use of the process filing strategy imply that if this strategy is used
by any industries in our sample, it is likely to be a small number of them. Consequently, we
would expect the outcome filing effects to dominate in a model that does not simultaneously
allow for the possibility of outcome and process ifiers.
In this section we examine whether it is possible to find evidence consistent with the use
of the process filing strategy by a subset of industries in our sample. Because the filing strategy
used by a firm is unobservable, we must account for this possibility in our econometric model
of filings, imports, and output. However, for the reasons just discussed there are also observable
variables that we believe should increase the probability a given industry is using theprocess
filing strategy rather than the outcome filing strategy.
Our general modeling approach is to specifr the filing strategy used by an industry for
our entire sample time period as a latent indicator (04) random variable y, where y =1if the
industry uses the process filing strategy and y1 =0 if the industry uses the outcome filing strategy.
The probability that y takes on the value 1 is assumed to depend on observable and unobservable
44industry characteristics at the beginning of our sample period. Conditional on each one of these
filing strategies we hypothesize a conditional distribution of filings, imports and output for our
sample period for each industry which embodies the restrictions on the mean function of industry-
level filings implied by each of the filing strategies.
The unrestricted form of our two-strategy model allows for the existence of two separate
joint distributionsoffilings, imports, and domestic output, conditional on the unobservable latent
variable y. It places no restrictions on which variables enter the filing rate function for either
strategy. It also places no restrictions on signs and relative magnitudes of the coefficients on the
five indicator variables in the mean function for imports and domestic output for either strategy.
Finally, our unrestricted model places no restrictions on how observable characteristics of the
industry affect the probability it is using either of the two filing strategies. If certain restrictions
can be imposed on this unrestricted two-strategy model, then we can conclude that there is
evidence for the simultaneous existence of both outcome and process filers.
The restrictions on our econometric model are guided by the theoretical results discussed
in Section 2. These results imply that process filers decide to initiate antiduinping suits based
purely on the level of capacity utilization in their industry. Consequently, the filing rate function
for the joint distribution of filings, imports, and output for the process filing strategy should
contain only capacity utilization. The theory gives no guidance concerning the dynamics of the
impact of capacity utilization on filing. We included lags of capacity utilization up to the point
where the null hypothesis of excluding further lags could not be rejected. This lead to the
inclusion of CAPU.1 and CAPU. On the other band, according to our discussion in Section
2, the filing rate function for outcome filers should contain all the variables used to determine
45injury describedinSection 3--IMPEN.1, CAPU1,EMP,and VADDJOUT111. Although the
same five indicator variables--OOP, OGPLFV, OUSUS, OGWD, OOD—enter the mean functions
for imports and output for both filing strategies, the coefficients associated with these variables
should differ across the two filing strategies in the manner predicted in our discussion of the
outcome and process filing strategies in Section 2. Evidence consistent with the co-existence of
outcome and process filers is that: (1) the restrictions on which variables enter into the process
and outcome filing equations are not rejected by the data; and (2) the sign.restrictions on the
coefficients associated without five petition-stage variables are not rejected for the import and
domestic output equations.
Although the true filing strategy used by an industry is unobservable, there are several
observable industry characteristics which may increase the probability that it is using thisstrategy.
We account for this by specif'ing the probability an industry is using theprocess filing strategy
as a function of observable industry characteristics. Several of these characteristics are meant to
reflect variation in the cost of using antidumping law across industries andcapture the notion that
the process filing strategy—whose benefits are relatively short-lived--is lesslikely to be chosen
by industries with high filing costs. The first characteristic is the beginning of the sample degree
of unionization in the industry. All firms in an industry benefit from theprotection provided by
an antidumping suit, but only those firms filing the suit bear the costs. Weexpect more highly
unionized industries to have higher probabilities of beingprocess filers because a strong union
presence in an industry provides an additional across-firm organization to assist in overcoming
the coordination and cost-sharing problems associated withfiling an antidumping suit on behalf
of the industry. The second factor is the size ofindustry, which we measure by the beginning
46of the sample level of employment. Because there is a substantial fixed cost component to filing
an antidumping suit, a large industry can share these fixed costs over a greater number of firms
and employees and therefore reduce the per firm and per employee suit filing cost. This in turn
means that less per firm expected benefits are necessary to trigger an antidumping suit petition,
making process filing more likely. The final variable is the beginning of sample import
penetration ratio. We expect larger values of this variable to be associated with higher
probabilities of process filing, for the reason that unless firms are faced with substantial import
competition there is very little reduction in domestic output due to these imports and therefore
onlya smallbenefit to reducing the flow of these imports. Consequently, the firms in the
industry will have little incentive to concern themselves with pursuing temporary protection
through antidumping law.
Econometric Model
The econometric model which we use to estimate the impacts of antidumping law on
imports and output while allowing for the possibility of both process and outcome filers extends
the basic econometric model of the joint distribution of filings, imports, and output developed and
utilized in previous sections. We wiLl outline the additions to this framework necessary to
construct the likelihood function in this case.
First, we speci& a distribution for the filing strategy regime indicator y. In this case we
hypothesize that
pr(,yj= 1 01)C'(;'a+p01), (23)
where C(t) is the standard normal distribution function, ; is a vector of beginning-of-the-sample
observable industry characteristics which predict the filing strategy used by an industry, and 01
47is the unobservable industry characteristic defined earlier, which also influences the filing strategy
used by an industry.
The conditional mean of the filing rate for the outcome strategy is
exp(y1, +y°,1MPEN111+
73°CAPU1a,.i+y?EMP,1+y,°(VADD1IOUT1)+0,)(24)
where mdenotesthe set of fixed time-effects. The conditional mean for the process strategy is
=
exp(y1+ + IçCAPUJ,..2+Se,) (25)
where 6 is a parameter which accounts for how O impacts the filing rate under the process filing
strategy. Following the procedure to derive the density of t given in (7), one can derive the
density of f1 conditional on y1 and 0, by substituting the strategy-specific conditional mean
function into pr(f 0). This yields pi(f 01,yj for j0,P.
Let the conditional mean function for IMP1G and OUTJG for the outcome (0) and




where k—m,o (for imports and output) and j=O,P (for outcome and process filers), so that we
allow for different -coefficients for each filing regime. We assume that the disturbances to the
conditional mean function for the process filing regime (1k')andfor the outcome regime (ti,°)
eachpossess the N(0,GI) distribution defmed earlier. By substituting the process strategy or
48outcome strategy conditional mean vector for imports and output into (18), we can derive
bj(IMP*,OUT1*181,y1), the density of imports and output conditional on y (the filing strategy j
beingfollowed by the industry) and 81.
Following the logic used toderive the joint density offilings, imports, and output for the
sample period given in (19) we can derive this same joint distribution condition on the filing
regime and 8. Let
gjj,JMP,OUT,' 8,.y) =h/IMP,0U'r,fl8,.y,)prfj (27)
where jr0orP. Then the density of (f,IMP*,OUT*), conditional on O only, can be derived
by "integrating" with respect to the density of the indicator variable y1:
g0f,,IMP1OTJT,8,) =g,(f,IMF,OUT,8,, y, =1)CD(z,'a+p6)
(28) +g0JMP,'OUT,'8,, y, =0)(1 — 'D(z/a + p8)).
Toobtain the unconditional distribution of filings, imports and output, we integrate with respect
to the discrete factor approximation forin the same manner as is done to derive (20). This
yields:
p0,(f,,IMF, 'OUT,) =ig0f,IMF,,OUT,16). (29)
49Taking the log of p0,(f1,IMP1*,OUT1*) yields the likelihood function which we maximize to
compute the estimates of the parameters of the three conditional mean functions for the two filing
strategies and the parameters of the filing strategy probability function.
Results
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates for the Probability of Process Filer equation
given in (23). Because we assume that pr(y1 =1)=(b(z1ta+ej theelements of a have the same
interpretation as those from a probit model. They are proportional to the increase in the
probability of the event y1 =I(the industry is a process filer) brought about by a one unit
increase in the variable associated with that coefficient Consequently, these estimates imply that
the probability an industry is a process filer is increasing in the percentage of all workers in the
industry that are unionized in 1979, the level of industry-wide employment in 1979, and the
import penetration ratio for this industry in 1979. To provide magnitudes which are more
amenable to interpretation we compute the average, over all 338 industries in our sample,
percentage increase in the probability that industry i is a process filer brought about by a one
percent increase in that element of;. These average probability elasticities are reported in the
second column in Table 6. For example, a one percent increase in the number of employees in
the industry predicts a 0.43 percent average increase in the probability that the industry is a
process filer.
The second and third columns of Table 2 present the filing equation estimates for the
outcome and process filing strategies. The outcome filing results are consistent with the earlier
two filing equation estimations. All of the variables enter in qualitatively the same manner as
for the two models estimated above. The filing equation for theprocess filing strategy excludes
50all variables but two lags of CAPU. According to our discussion of the process filing strategy,
only capacity utilization should enter this filing equation. The addition of the remaining three
regressors, IMPEN, flAP, and VADD/OUT, to this equation does not add any statistically
significant explanatory power to the model (the likelihood ratio test does not reject the null
hypothesis that these three coefficients are jointly zero), which lends some support to the presence
of two distinct filing strategies.
The third and fourth columns of Tables 3-4 present the import and output equations for
the outcome and process filing strategies, respectively. For the outcome filing strategy, the third
column of Tables 3 and 4 yield investigation effects similar to the effects estimated for the single
filing strategy import and output equations presented in the previous section. The major
difference between these two sets of results is the slightly decreased estimated precision for the
estimates in the third column of Tables 3 and Table 4. The results in the fourth column of
Tables 3 and 4 present a different story of the impacts of antidumping suits on imports and
output All of the investigation effects beyond simply the filing of an antidumping suit are
considerably smaller in absolute value and quite imprecisely estimated. The only investigation
effect which seems present under the process filing strategy is the suit filing impact Under this
strategy, the filing of antidumping suit predicts an immediate reduction in the rate of imports and
an increase in the rate of domestic output. The remaining stages of the process appear to have
little impact on the rate of imports or domestic output Even the impact of antidumping duties,
although estimated to be trade-restricting, is not very precisely estimated.
To provide a comparative view of the accumulated trade restricting effects of these
different filing strategies we present figures depicting the estimated accumulated trade distortions
51from a hypothetical suit filing, analogous to Figures 2 through 5. Figure 6 depicts the effect on
the levels of imports, output, and the sum of imports and output of a petition that is filed by an
outcome filer in month 6, receives an affirmative preliminstyLTFVdetermination in month 11,
andanegative final determination in month 18. Figure 7 depicts the import, output and net
import andoutputeffect for the same investigation history when filed by a process filer. As the
figures depict, there appears to be a striking difference in the pattern of import, output and net
response to the various phases of the investigation process across the two filing strategies in a
way that is consistent with our outcome and process filer interpretations.
The net effect results for outcome filers, presented in column 3 of Table 5, are consistent
with those obtained for the single filing strategy model. Although all but the OGPLFVjt/Gftand
OGD/G net coefficients are essentially zero, these two coefficients indicate significant net
import and output reductions from these stages of the suit resolution process under the outcome
filing strategy, and hence net domestic consumer welfare losses. The net effect results for
process filers, presented in column 4 of Table 5, imply that the only nonzero net effect is the
large OGPJG effect. This effect indicates substantial net import and output reductions from the
filing of a petition under the process filing strategy. Consequently, there are also welfare losses
to domestic consumers under the process filing strategy. More importsntly these welfare losses
result from the filing of an antidumping petition which is evidently motivated by a desire to
secure the trade restiicting effects of the investigation alone.
Althoughas emphasized at the beginning of this section, the filing strategy pursued by
a given industry is a unobservable, our model does allow the computation of the probability that
52an industry is a process filer given the estimated parameters of our econometric model and the
vector; from the equation:
pr(y,= Iz,)
= + e'). (30)
The sample average of these probabilities gives an estimate of the proportion of industries
pursuing the process filing strategy. For our parameter estimates, the sample avenge of the
probability that an industry is a process filer is 3.5 percent Assuming the validity of our two
strategy model, this implies that approximately 10 industries are process filers, with the vast
majority being outcome ifiers. This is consistent with our initial view that outcome filing is
major use of antidumping law.
To further investigate the implications of our two filing strategy model we computed the
value of (30) for all observations in our sample and ranked industries by the probability of being
a process filer. The three highest probability process filer industries are: SIC-3312, Blast
Furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills; SIC-3714, Motor vehicle parts and accessories; and SIC-
3711, Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies. Other notable industries in the top ten highest
probability process filer category are: SIC-3721, Aircraft; and SIC-3662, Radio and television
53transmitting, signalingand detection equipment and appaiatus.'t Once we move outside the ten
highest probability process filer industries, the probability that any of the remaining industries is
a process filer falls rapidly from less than 10 percent to 0.7 percent. Consequently, all of the
remaining industries have a very low estimated probability of following the process filing
strategy.
Finally, recall that as we have defmed them, outcome filers initiate suits primarily to
obtain the protection that comes with a fmding of dumping and the explicit remedies that follow
(duties or suspension agreements). On the other hand, process filers are primarily interested in
the temporary protection afforded by the antidumping suit resolution process, and do not file with
the intent of eventually obtaining explicit remedies. Thus, a final implication of the process filing
strategy is that the rate of duties per suit flied should be substantially lower for the process filers
relative to the outcome filers. To investigate this hypothesis we took the ten highest probability
process filer industries and computed the sum of OGD over these industries for all six years in
our sample. We then divided this sum by the sum of f. over these same industries for all six
years in our sample. This ratio gives the per-suit level of duty activity for this process filer
sample. We repeated this same calculation for the remaining observations in our sample to
"Although we would like to caution that these probabilities are conditional on the validity
of both our underlying process filer theory and our econometric model, anecdotal evidence seems
to supports the plausibility of these results. For example, concerning the filing behavior of the
steel industry (the industry most likely according to our results to be aprocess filer) The
Economist writes:
One lawyer who specializes in international trade says that, for a struggling mill,
$400,000 to bring an antidumping suit is money well-spent, even without a fmal
ruling; the process gums up the trade gears sufficiently to steer buyers back to
domestic steel (The Economist, May 16, 1992,p. 98).
54compute the per-suit level of duty activity for this outcome filer sample. Dividing theprocess
filer ratio by the outcome filer ratio yields 5.5. This indicates that, for oursample, a product
level antidumping suit is 5.5timesmore likely to end in duties for an outcome filer than for one
of our ten highest probability process filers. This result is consistent with the view thatprocess
filers file less for the eventual protection provided by duties than do outcome filers.
6.Conclusion
Wesummarize our empirical findings as follows.First,we fmd strong evidence that
antidumping law effects imports and import-competing output in important ways other than
through the imposition of duties. In particular, we fmd that suspension agreements lead to
outcomes which are comparable in their restrictiveness to the imposition of antidumping duties.
Moreover, there appear to be important investigation effects associated with antidumping
petitions: our results suggest that petitioning firms may enjoy import relief during the
investigation period which amounts to about half of what they might expect from a positive final
determination and duty imposition. We also find evidence of two kinds of filing strategies:
"outcome" filers who file petitions for the possibility of seeing duties imposed, and "process"
filers who file for the trade-restrictive effects of the investigation process alone. Finally, we fmd
little evidence that withdrawn petitions lead to restricted trade.
To provide some idea of the magnitude of these within-investigation and post-investigation
effects of antidumping suits we have made some rough calculations of the trade distorting effects
of all of the antidumping suits that occur over our sample period using our single strategy
55parameter estimates given in the second column of Tables 3 and 4. To compute the total sample
distortions to imports and output from the suit resolution process we compute:
NT NT
= E E F3TOGP.+'OGPLFVand D, =E E I37OGPk
+13;0GPLFvk.
I—I"1 i—i I—i
Tocompute the entire sample distortions to imports and output from the post-investigation
effects, we compute:
NT NT
= 13'OGSUSJ,+P,'OGDJ,and D =S S s;oasus,,
+f3OGD1.
1—Ii—I I—I s—I
Weexclude the effects due to withdrawn suits because the coefficients associated with
OGWDit/Ga in both the import and output equations are never statistically different from zero.
We then compute IMPTOT and OiJTrOT, which are the sum of total imports and output over
all indusizies and years in our sample, and express Dm and D' as a percentage of IMPTOT,
and D° and D°Dasa percentage of OUTFOT. We find that over our sample of industries
for the six years of available data, the total amount of import reductions due to all investigation
effects is approximately -0.26 percent of total imports over the sample period. On the other
hand, the total distortions due to post-investigation effects is -4.37 percent of IMPTOT. Both the
total investigation and post-investigation effects are a very small percentage of OUTFOT, 0.0008
percent and 0.42 percent respectively. To compute the net import and output effects for our
sample period we compute D' +D°as a percentage of OUTFOT +IMPTOT,and D'
56+ D°as a percentage of OUflOT+IMPTOT. The investigation and post-investigation net
distortions percentages are -0.03 and -0.14.
An obvious question that arises if one takes seriously the investigation effects we have
found is: Why don't more industries file antidumping suits? There are two factors which work
against more industries pursuing this form of protection. The first has to do with the design of
antidumpinglaw. As mentionedearlier, suits must be filed by either an interested party on behalf
of the industry, or are self-initiated by the ITA. Although the interested party is usually an
industry association or a large fraction of firms in the industry, there still is a cost of organizing
and coordinating to take the necessary action to file a suit. The second factor is the explicit
economic cost of hiring the necessary legal and administrative expertise to file an antidumping
suit. This cost can easily amount to a half-miffion dollars or more, and the protection provided,
assuming neither duties nor a suspension agreement is eventually imposed, lasts roughly one year.
Consequently, the expected annual benefits to the petitioning party should at least exceed these
costs in order for filing to be rational. This circumstance does not seem likely for most of the
industries in our sample.
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59Table 1: Means and Standard Errors of Variables
2028_Year-Industry_Observations (i1,...,N=338 industries and t1,...,T=6 years)
Variable Definition Mean Standard Error
f Total Filings 0.928 13.69
Git Total TSUS Codes 33.63 131.86
IMP Real Imports in 10'
19Th dollars 291.14 1151.19
OUTS Real Output in 10'
1912 dollars 2168.61 4161.81
EMPft Industry Level Em-
ploymentxlO' 136 . 62.18
VADD1/OUT,1 Value-Added








Less Than Fair Value 0.159 2.711
OGSUSh Ongoing Suspension 0.177 3.418
OGWD1, Ongoing Withdrawal 0.558 12.047
OGDU Ongoing Duties 0.300 3.3 12




60Table 2: Filing Rate Equations Estimates





Two Filing Strategy Model





















































61Table 3:Import Equations Estimates
N =338Industries for T =6Years
Vaziable Coefficient Estimate
(Standard Error)


















































































































































63Table 5:Outputand Import Net Eflcts
Sum of Suit Activity Index Coefficient Estimates Given in Tables 3 and 4
Variable Coefficient Estimate
(Standard Error)









































Table 6: Probability of Process Filer Model
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